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Introduction
Design for behaviour change (Lilley, 2009; Wever, 2012) is 
part of what Redström (2005) calls “a progression towards the 
user becoming the subject of design” (p. 124), with “design as 
an intervention into multiple and interpenetrating technical, 
material and social systems” (Mazé & Redström, 2008, p. 55). 
Dubberly and Pangaro (2007, p. 1302) note design’s growing 
concern with “ways of behaving”, and popular guidebooks 
and toolkits explaining the practical applicability of a range of 
behavioural principles to design have become common in recent 
years, particularly in interaction design, service design and user 
experience design (e.g., Anderson, 2010, 2011; Dirksen, 2012; 
Lockton, Harrison, & Stanton, 2010a; Pfarr, Cervantes, Lavey, 
Lee, Hintzman, & Vuong, 2010; Weinschenk, 2009, 2011). 
Much of this focuses on changing behaviour: the aim 
generally is to translate psychological principles or effects into 
strategies or techniques which can be applied via the design of 
products and services, to influence users’ behaviour, often for 
social benefit (e.g., Tromp, Hekkert, & Verbeek, 2011; Visser, 
Vastenburg, & Keyson, 2011) or environmental benefit (e.g., 
Lockton, Cain, Harrison, Giudice, Nicholson, & Jennings, 2011; 
Mazé & Redström, 2008). The field overlaps substantially 
with the aims of persuasive technology (Fogg, 2003), and may 
contribute to transformation design (Sangiorgi, 2011) as design is 
employed to facilitate change.
As design practice becomes increasingly focused on 
people, modelling human behaviour is becoming an explicit aspect 
of designers’ responsibilities (Keinonen, 2010). The different 
approaches taken to understanding behaviour can result in a 
wide spectrum of strategies, framing both problems and solutions 
in a variety of ways (e.g., Brand, 2004; Lidman & Renström, 
2011; Lockton et al., 2010a; Tang & Bhamra, 2008; Tromp et 
al., 2011; Wever, van Kuijk, & Boks, 2008; Zachrisson & Boks, 
2012). What is still needed is an approach to modelling which 
links insights from contextual research (with users themselves) 
to possible design strategies (Lockton, Harrison, & Stanton, 
2012). This has the potential to be particularly valuable in design 
for behaviour change, giving designers greater understanding of 
users’ behaviour and how to influence it. 
The research question we explored in this paper, is whether 
it is possible to develop an approach that links insights from 
user research with applicable design techniques in the context of 
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design for behaviour change, through modelling both interaction 
behaviour and design techniques in terms of simple abstracted 
‘rules’–behavioural heuristics. The approach complements 
but differs from other nascent modelling approaches used 
within design for behaviour change and persuasive technology, 
drawing on ideas from human factors, behavioural economics, 
and decision research to explore and frame behavioural 
problem-solution pairs (Dorst & Cross, 2001) in-context, rather 
than starting with classifying design strategies.
This paper takes an exploratory approach to examine the 
potential of using behavioural heuristics as part of the design 
process in design for behaviour change: we are not claiming 
this to be a definitive solution to the question of how to specify 
relevant design techniques, but rather we are suggesting that 
this is an approach which may be useful to practitioners seeking 
to model user behaviour through insights from user research. 
Further, we wish to stimulate discussion in the area of design for 
behaviour change. We start by reviewing how models of human 
behaviour play an important part in design for behaviour change, 
and how they link to different ways of framing problem/solution 
spaces. We then consider the potential of investigating users’ 
mental models, and propose behavioural heuristics as a lower-
level approach to modelling in comparison to conventional 
mental models, which seek to model behavior in a more 
comprehensive way. We do this by drawing on ideas from a 
number of fields.  
Via a case study concerning users’ interaction with heating 
systems, we introduce the idea of heuristics, followed by worked 
examples in the ‘other direction’, extracting heuristics from case 
studies of existing systems designed to influence user behaviour, 
to illustrate both ends of a possible design process using 
heuristics. We then discuss the potential place of behavioural 
heuristics within a design process for behaviour change, 
including their use in conjunction with other approaches.
The Place of Modelling in Design for 
Behaviour Change
In the academic literature on design for behaviour change, 
some critical reflection has centred on issues such as ethics 
(Gram-Hansen, 2010; Pettersen & Boks, 2008) or on users’ 
understanding of the ‘persuasive’ intentions of the designers 
(Crilly, 2011), but perhaps the central research challenge in this 
emerging field, at least from the perspective of design practice, 
is that of matching the most effective and appropriate design 
strategies to particular behaviours (Zachrisson & Boks, 2012).
Diverse approaches to how to model and ‘treat’ users 
when seeking to influence behaviour can result in a wide 
spectrum of strategies, a phenomenon familiar to ‘non-design’ 
fields which regularly deal with behavioural interventions, such 
as healthcare (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007; Michie, van 
Stralen, & West, 2011). Some researchers have built programmes 
around the exploration of particular models and strategies 
for influencing behaviour and user experience (e.g., affective 
and emotional design: Ozkaramanli & Desmet, 2012; Desmet 
& Hekkert, 2009). There are also many ‘design for behaviour 
change’ approaches that involve classifying multiple techniques 
via different dimensions and categories with the aim of helping 
designers explore the strategies available (Brand, 2004; Lidman 
& Renström, 2011; Lockton et al., 2010a; Tang & Bhamra, 2008; 
Tromp et al., 2011; Wever et al., 2008; Zachrisson & Boks, 2012). 
Others (Fogg & Hreha, 2010; Lockton, Harrison, & Stanton, 
2010b) have aimed to guide designers towards strategies which 
may be most applicable to particular ‘target behaviours’, more 
along the lines of TRIZ (Altshuller, 1994). 
Models and Frames
As Froehlich, Findlater, and Landay (2010) put it, “even if it is not 
explicitly recognised, designers [necessarily] approach a problem 
with some model of human behaviour” (p. 2000)–modelling is 
central to design (Alexander, 1964; Ayres, 2007; Dubberly & 
Pangaro, 2007), though the models employed may be diverse. 
The range of designers’ models of human behaviour can be 
especially evident in design for behaviour change, where every 
concept proposed inherently embodies a model of how users 
will behave as a result of the design (Lockton, Harrison, & 
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Stanton, 2012). Argyris and Schön (1974, p. 28) suggested that 
“an interventionist is a man struggling to make his model of man 
come true”, and each of the interventionists’ models represents a 
particular way of framing both ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ in terms 
of what affects and is affected by human behaviour. We should, 
of course, remember that “all models are wrong, but some are 
useful” (Box & Draper, 1987, p. 424); likewise, concerns with 
the very notion of ‘the user’ (e.g., Keinonen, 2010; Krippendorff, 
2007) are noted, but we argue that it remains a useful construct in 
this kind of modelling.
Rasmussen (1986) refers to different models of users each 
“support[ing] the choice of an interface design that will activate 
a category of behaviour” (p. 61), and this arguably applies to all 
kinds of intervention, not just interface design. For example, a 
designer modelling users as primarily ‘lazy’ or uninterested may 
try to influence users’ decisions by making the ‘target’ behaviour 
the easiest choice, such as a default setting (Frederick, 2002; 
Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Kesan & Shah, 2006), whereas a 
designer modelling users as being motivated by intrinsic factors 
such as social relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 1985) or connectedness 
(Visser et al., 2011) may apply techniques emphasising that a 
user is contributing to the well-being of the wider community in 
making particular choices. The resulting design solutions may 
aim to influence the same ultimate target behaviour, but can differ 
substantially through modelling humans “at several levels of 
abstraction” (Rasmussen, 1983, p. 266). 
The models used by designers thus provide some structure 
to problem/solution ‘spaces’ (Maher, Poon, & Boulanger, 1996), 
framing and redefining the “problematic situation” (Schön, 1983, 
p.68) in a variety of ways, each of which exposes new aspects 
of the problem (Rith & Dubberly, 2007; Rittel & Webber, 
1973). Hey (2008) found that design teams will re-frame 
problem/solution spaces repeatedly over the course of a project, 
negotiating an evolving ‘common’ frame which aims to 
reconcile the perspectives and needs of both designers and users. 
Design becomes “a process of enquiry during which meaning is 
constructed with diverse stakeholders” (Kimbell, 2011, p. 49); 
‘solutions’ will not be ‘perfect’ resolutions (Ebenreuter, 2007) but 
will address certain perspectives and interpretations of meaning. 
Problem-solution Pairs
Dorst and Cross (2001) suggest that the emergent formation 
of ‘bridges’–pairing one representation of the problem with an 
apposite solution–is what defines the insight of the ‘creative 
leap’. Cross (2006) describes an example of a design brief 
concerning a way to transport a hiker’s backpack on a mountain 
bike: this included a number of potential sub-problems. The 
designers in the study “oscillat[ed] between sub-solution 
and sub-problem areas… partial models of the problem and 
solution are constructed side-by-side” (p. 57), with each concept 
addressing particular representations of the problem, creating 
problem-solution pairs. A particular sub-solution (a moulded 
plastic tray) enabled a number of the partial models to be 
mapped onto each other. 
As Cross (2006) explains, this interpretation differs from 
models of the design process emphasising clear ‘stage’-based 
separation between a defined problem specification and the 
generation of multiple alternative solutions; the generation 
of partial solutions enables the problem to be modelled and 
examined in different ways and the original brief reframed. 
Likewise, problem-solution pairs could be also a valuable unit of 
analysis in design for behaviour change, explicitly incorporating 
a particular model of the problematic situation, and indeed the 
context in which the solution is applicable. A problem-solution 
pair rooted in a problem context itself can be seen to be ‘solving’ 
the problem in a different way compared with a solution which 
only addresses its ‘symptoms’ (something which arguably 
characterises many approaches to behaviour change, for example 
those based solely on rewarding or punishing people for 
particular behaviours). 
Using this framework, if designers are going to try to 
address particular behavioural ‘problems’ they need to do 
sufficient research with users to develop models matching 
the contextual reality of their situated decision-making 
(Suchman, 2007). This means that contextual user research is 
essential. However, as design for behaviour change becomes 
seen as less about influencing broad public opinions and 
attitudes (e.g., towards the environment, or health), and much 
more about understanding and developing empathy (Postma, 
Zwartkruis-Pelgrim, Daemen, & Du, 2012) user participation 
as described by Ho and Lee (2012) also becomes essential. 
User participation in this sense allows designers to take into 
account the contextual factors affecting how people make 
situated decisions about how to act in everyday life, which 
includes expectations of outcomes, perceptions of meaning and 
perceived affordances.
Similar ideas have been discussed in cybernetics, which 
offers a number of useful constructs for designers working with 
behaviour (Dubberly & Pangaro, 2007). Conant and Ashby’s 
(1970) ‘Good Regulator’ theorem states that “every good 
regulator of a system must be a model of that system”, with 
the corollary that modelling is a necessary part of regulating 
a system’s behaviour; indeed, Beer (1974, p. 34) notes that 
“no regulator can actually work unless it contains a model of 
whatever is to be regulated”. Designers may not see themselves 
as ‘regulators’–even those explicitly involved in behaviour 
change–but as Scholten (2009-10, p. 3) has argued, an implication 
of Conant and Ashby is simply that “every good solution must 
be a model of the problem it solves”: not too far from Dorst and 
Cross’s (2001) concept of problem-solution pairs. 
Mental Models and Heuristics in  
Design for Behaviour Change
One approach to understanding and modelling user behaviour 
in context is to investigate users’ own understanding and 
mental models of the systems with which they are interacting; 
as Krippendorff (2007) puts it, “designers who intend to design 
something that has the potential of being meaningful to others 
need to understand how others conceptualize their world” 
(p. 1386). 
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There are different ways of defining and representing 
mental models (Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch., 2011; 
Moray, 1996). One definition commonly used in human-computer 
interaction (HCI) is described broadly by Carroll, Olson, and 
Anderson (1987) as: “knowledge of how the system works, 
what its components are, how they are related, what the internal 
processes are, and how they affect the components” (p. 6). Users’ 
mental models thus allow them “not only to construct actions for 
novel tasks but also to explain why a particular action produces 
the results it does” (p. 6). 
In the context of influencing behaviour change, mental 
models could be important if a user’s current model leads him 
or her to behave or interact with a system in a way which is 
undesirable, dangerous, inefficient or otherwise deemed deserving 
of intervention. For example: Besnard, Greathead, and Baxter 
(2004) discuss how an erroneous mental model held by the flight 
crew can be considered a major factor in the 1989 Kegworth air 
crash in Leicestershire, England; Kempton’s (1986) investigation 
of home heating control found that patterns of thermostat use 
(some more wasteful of fuel than others) were largely consistent 
with two different mental models of how thermostats work (the 
‘valve’ model and the ‘threshold’ or ‘switch’ model); Thaler’s 
(1999) work on ‘mental accounting’ suggests that different ways 
of modelling and categorising everyday financial transactions can 
lead people to make irrational or myopic budgeting decisions to 
their own detriment; Senge (1990) looks at how tacit but wrong 
mental models can lead to poor organisational performance, and 
how ‘surfacing’ and changing them can improve matters.
The aim of a designer seeking to change behaviour via 
mental models would usually be to shift the user’s mental model 
(if incorrect) to a more accurate one, perhaps by making the 
system model evident (an aim of ecological interface design: 
Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004), via a series of analogical steps 
bridging the two models (Clement, 1991), or by increasing 
the repertoire of models available to users–as Papert (1980) 
put it, “[learning] anything is easy if you can assimilate it to 
your collection of models” (p. vii). Alternatively, an aim could 
be to redesign a system so that it appears to work in the way 
that the user assumes, working with the existing model even if 
incorrect. In both cases, the effectiveness of the approach could 
be examined by measuring behaviour changes that have occurred 
as a result of intervention. 
Both approaches require investigating users’ current 
mental models of the systems they use–within design research 
and in human factors, methods such as interviews, verbal protocol 
analyses, structured tasks (e.g., Payne, 1991), eye-tracking, 
cultural probes (Gaver, Dunne, & Pacenti, 1999), ethnography and 
shadowing can all help reveal aspects of subjects’ understandings 
and internal representations of situations, via examining and 
mapping interaction behaviour, routines, shifts in focus or 
even the errors people make. Even with an extensive palette of 
methods, the fundamental difficulty nevertheless remains; mental 
models are “not available for direct inspection or measurement” 
(Jones et al., 2011, p. 46).   
Lower-level Modelling:  
Behavioural Heuristics as Problem-solution Pairs
As part of an industrial collaboration project, we have 
investigated aspects of people’s mental models of heating, 
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) and energy use, and 
perceptions of the role played by behaviour, at home and at work. 
The aim was to use the insights gained to design feedback systems 
which lead to lower energy use through behaviour change. We 
interviewed people about their behaviour and usage patterns of 
heating systems. From these interviews we found that, in many 
cases, interviewees did not, in context, consider much of the 
system beyond their immediate interactions with it.
This issue has been recognised in some treatments of 
mental models, such as Collins and Gentner’s (1987) concept 
of ‘pastiche models’ (which recognises that the models applied 
at different levels may be inconsistent). Rather than making 
decisions based on macro-level comprehension of a ‘whole’ 
mental model (such as it may be), it often appeared that people’s 
reported interaction decisions were determined by sets of 
individual ‘rules’ considered at the micro-level–“If this is the 
situation, do that”, “If I have that problem, this is how I fix 
it”–intended to satisfice (Simon, 1956, 1969) for the situation 
at hand. The idea is reminiscent of Argyris and Schön’s (1974) 
theories-in-use, or Minsky’s (1983) suggestion that “the only 
way a person can understand anything very complicated is to 
understand it at each moment only locally” (p. 189)–and raises 
questions about how appropriate it is to consider designing 
‘whole system’ solutions as opposed to decomposition into 
lower-level sub-problems and sub-solutions. From a design 
perspective, should designers try to understand users on 
the level of individual behaviours, or in larger ‘units’ such 
as personas? This issue is considered further in the section 
‘Discussion: fitting into design practice’.
Returning to the interviews, many explanations given by 
interviewees were something closer to Dorst and Cross’s (2001) 
problem-solution pairs than full-blown mental models: they 
were, essentially, heuristics for how to interact with the system 
in a range of situations rather than explanations of how the 
whole system was believed to work. Each heuristic presented 
a certain way of framing the problematic situation perceived 
by the interviewee, and the immediate behavioural solution 
undertaken (Figure 1). The section of this paper titled ‘Case 
study: extracting heuristics around interaction with heating’ 
elaborates on the study. 
Situation Actionif then
(problem) (solution)
Figure 1. A heuristic represented as a simple 
‘problem-solution pair’.
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Using Heuristics to Simplify the 
Problem / Solution Space
What are heuristics? There are a number of definitions, but the 
term as used in current behavioural economics and decision 
science generally refers to simple, frugal ‘rules of thumb’, tacit 
or explicit, for making decisions and solving problems. Groner, 
Groner, and Bischof (1983) note that they are “used to reduce the 
search space of a given problem” (p. 16), and this is a common 
thread through research with heuristics in different disciplines, 
including mathematical problem-solving (Pólya, 1945), education 
(Papert, 1980), artificial intelligence (Newell, 1983), cooperation 
in groups (Gardner, Ostrom, & Walker, 1992), behavioural 
economics (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) and decision research (Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2001; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group., 1999). 
Heuristics are qualitatively different to other components 
of behavioural models such as attitudes and habits: instead they 
characterise the phenomenon of people bounding or simplifying 
the problem/solution spaces they experience, framing situations 
in terms of a particular perspective, tentative assumption 
or salient piece of information, rather than undertaking an 
exhaustive analysis of all possible courses of action. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic 
involves deciding on the likelihood of an event based on how 
easy it is to bring to mind similar events, and Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer’s (1999) recognition heuristic involves attributing 
a higher value to objects which are recognised than those 
which are not; just as Pólya’s (1945) exhortation to “Look at 
the unknown! And try to think of a familiar problem having the 
same or a similar unknown” (p. 73) involves starting to solve 
a mathematical problem by finding a point of comparison with 
other problems. 
In different circumstances, the application of heuristics 
has been considered both harmful and potentially beneficial. 
Much behavioural economics discourse (e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008) concerns ways to overcome biases introduced by the use 
of heuristics, whereas the ‘ecological rationality’ approach (e.g., 
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012) focuses on situations where the use 
of particular heuristics is actually adaptive, and thus on how to 
improve decision-making through exploiting (or changing) the 
information structure of people’s decision environments. From 
a design perspective, it seems clear that there are circumstances 
where simplification is valuable to users (Colborne, 2010; Krug, 
2006), and others where it can cause problems (just as with 
mental models). 
Within ‘design for behaviour change’, to date little attention 
has been paid to the possibilities and implications of heuristics. 
Rogers and her collaborators (Kalnikaitė et al., 2011; Rogers, 
2011; Todd, Rogers, & Payne, 2011) have used an ecological 
rationality approach in the design of a shopping trolley-mounted 
system giving supermarket shoppers simple, salient information 
on the ‘food miles’ of products, but there is also the possibility for 
heuristics to be used as part of user research and problem-framing 
for design, as the remainder of this paper will discuss.
Simple Rules and Levels of Abstraction
The notion of modelling behaviour in terms of ‘if... then...’ rules 
has been explored in a number of disciplines, not necessarily 
under the ‘heuristics’ banner. 
Aside from the obvious parallels in computer programming 
itself, examples include: von Wright’s (1972) treatment of 
practical inference mechanisms, e.g., “I intend to make it true that 
E. Unless I do A, I shall not achieve this. Therefore I must do 
A” (p. 44); Argyris and Schön’s (1974) discussion of representing 
theories of action in the form “in situation S, if you want to 
achieve consequence C, do A” (p. 5); and the ‘fuzzy’ rule-based 
problem-solving method developed by Hunt and Rouse (1982) 
and Rouse (1983), which includes context-specific S-rules [e.g., 
“if: The engine will not start and the starter motor is turning and 
the battery is strong, then: Check the gas gauge” (Hunt & Rouse, 
1982, p. 293)] and more generally applicable context-free T-rules 
[e.g., “if: The output of I is bad and I depends on Y and Z, and Y 
is known to be in working, then: Check Z” (Hunt & Rouse, 1982, 
p. 294)]. Minsky (2006) compares a ‘rule-based reaction machine’ 
approach of following basic “If situation → Do action” rules with 
goal-driven “If situation and goal → Do action” and deliberative 
“If situation + Do action → Then result” mental simulations. 
Within human factors, Rasmussen’s (1983, 1986) Skills, 
Rules and Knowledge (SRK) framework situates rule-based 
behaviour in the context of other kinds of human performance. 
As opposed to skill-based behaviour, which comprises automatic 
patterns of response with simple feedback and without conscious 
attention, and knowledge-based behaviour, which makes use of 
stored knowledge, conscious analysis and mental simulations, 
rule-based behaviour is essentially the use of heuristics. It is 
“consciously controlled by a stored rule or procedure that may 
have been derived empirically during previous occasions, 
communicated from other persons’ know-how as an instruction or 
cookbook recipe, or it may be prepared on occasion by conscious 
problem solving and planning” (Rasmussen, 1986, p. 102). 
Rule-based behaviour is informed by signs in the environment, 
which “indicate a state in the environment with reference to 
certain conventions for acts...they serve to activate stored patterns 
of behaviour” (p. 108). Rasmussen gives the example of a 
flowmeter gauge in a pipeline with a valve, with four particular 
positions identified on the scale. The rules or “stereotype acts” are 
“If valve open, and: if indication C: OK; if indication D: adjust 
flow; If valve closed, and: if indication A: OK; if indication B: 
recalibrate meter” (p. 107). In rule-based behaviour, when errors 
(‘incorrect’ behaviour) occur, they may be due to misclassifying 
the situation and hence applying the wrong rule (Reason, 1990).
Another aspect of Rasmussen’s (1983, 1986) framework 
relevant to modelling user behaviour is the treatment of 
abstraction in task analysis, including users’ decision-making 
when interacting with systems. An abstraction hierarchy–in 
human factors research often created as a phase of cognitive 
work analysis (Jenkins, Stanton, Salmon, & Walker, 2008; 
Vicente, 1999)–outlines multiple representations of a system, 
www.ijdesign.org 42 International Journal of Design Vol. 7 No. 1 2013
Exploring Problem-framing through Behavioural Heuristics
from functional purpose to physical form, with different models 
of the system (means and ends) applicable at each level of 
abstraction. From a design perspective, what occurs is “a 
process of iteration between considerations at the various levels 
[of abstraction] rather than an orderly transformation from a 
description of purpose to a description in terms of physical form” 
(Rasmussen, 1983, p. 265); similar approaches to abstraction and 
decomposition have been discussed by Alexander (1964), de Bono 
(1993) and Straker and Rawlinson (2002), while Dörner (1983), 
specifically in the context of heuristics, discusses the use of 
multiple levels of ‘resolution’ of problematic situations to enable 
the selection of appropriate strategies. Ishikawa’s (1990) fishbone 
cause-and-effect diagrams, as used in quality management, also 
have much in common with this modelling approach, and we 
make use of a similar ‘5 Whys’ (e.g., Pylipow & Royall, 2001) 
or ‘laddering’ (Hawley, 2009) technique below in the section 
‘Elaborating the heuristics: five whys and further abstraction’. 
The abstraction notion, and the resolution into ‘means and 
ends’ as a representation of the system at each level, again has 
parallels with Dorst and Cross’s (2001) problem-solution pairs 
in design and the concept of simple behavioural heuristics. By 
identifying the levels of abstraction at which users’ heuristics can 
be considered to be operating, it is possible to understand better 
the context in which the behaviour is occurring, and frame the 
problem accordingly as part of the design process.
Case Study: Extracting Heuristics 
Around Interaction with Heating
This case study illustrates one practical application of the 
heuristics idea within user research, as part of a design for 
behaviour change project. 
Sixteen office workers at two organisations (a government 
department and a university, both in London) were interviewed 
individually as part of a study of building users’ understanding of 
energy use. As part of a wider series of structured questions and 
exercises, we asked interviewees to describe what actions they 
would take, at work, if they were i) too hot, and ii) too cold. These 
are effectively behavioural heuristics as outlined above: simple 
‘if... then...’ statements describing behaviour in response to 
particular contextual conditions: we do not claim or aim to imply 
any deeper insight into human decision-making than simply 
asking people to express what they would do, in this particular 
form. Interviewees were subsequently (as described in the section 
‘Elaborating the heuristics: 5 Whys and further abstraction’) asked 
to elaborate the reasons behind the heuristics given, following a 
laddering or 5 Whys-type method–for each answer given by an 
interviewee, the interviewer reframed this as a further “Why?” 
question–see Figure 2(a) for an example. The number of times 
“Why?” was asked was not always five; the intention here was 
not necessarily to determine a ‘root cause’ (assuming such a thing 
exists), but instead to derive multiple, iterated levels of abstraction 
for each heuristic, enabling a more diverse set of representations 
for problem-framing.
Heuristic Statements as Situated Strategies
Table 1 shows the heuristic statements given by interviewees 
for both the ‘too hot’ and ‘too cold’ conditions; where multiple 
answers are present, each is presented in the order mentioned 
by the interviewees, as a kind of ‘else’ clause. Interviewees 1-8 
worked in a building with locked windows and ceiling-mounted 
HVAC controlled by a building management system (BMS); one 
interviewee (2) remembered that some windows had previously 
been unlocked (during a period when the air conditioning was 
switched off) and included this as part of her set of heuristics. 
The ‘draughty’ windows mentioned by two interviewees had a 
noticeable draught around the frame when closed. 
Interviewees 9-13, 15 and 16 worked in buildings with 
central heating, radiators and opening windows, while interviewee 
14’s office had an opening window as well as BMS-controlled 
HVAC, but no user controls on the floor-mounted heating vents. 
The only interviewee with an air conditioner under her control, 
16, preferred not to use it since she was unsure of the interface.
From the point of view of understanding the links between 
behaviour and energy use, an important implication here is that 
the “If I were too hot, then I would open the window” (or variant) 
heuristics given by 9-12 and 14-16 have the potential to lead 
directly to energy inefficiency: if the radiators are on, opening the 
window as first recourse, rather than adjusting the radiator, will 
simply lead to heat being wasted, with no feedback loop to the 
building manager or BMS. Indeed, in the case of 14, in an office 
with BMS-controlled HVAC, opening the window to cool down 
may cause the thermocouple temperature sensor in the room to 
signal the BMS to increase the amount of heating. Interviewees 
9,11,12 and 13’s use of their own electric heaters and fans would 
be against the policies of many building managers, as well as 
increasing energy use. Other heuristics of potential interest or 
concern to building managers include 7’s declaration that she 
might simply “go home” from work if she were too cold in the 
office, and 2 and 8 who both choose to sit near (unintentionally) 
draughty window frames because of the lower temperature 
(and fresher air) this affords. This kind of empirical ‘revealed 
preference’ is valuable as an insight into the real day-to-day 
comfort needs of building users, along the lines of some of the 
post-occupancy evaluation insights uncovered by Hadi and 
Halfhide (2009). 
While the specific insights in this case are of most 
relevance to the HVAC context, and probably the particular 
workplaces studied, the aim from the perspective of this article 
is simply to demonstrate how the first stage of asking users 
for their ‘situated strategy’ heuristics in response to particular 
problems can be practically carried out. The next stage continues 
that demonstration.
Elaborating the Heuristics:  
5 Whys and Further Abstraction
After recording the simple heuristic statements, we then used a 
5 Whys process to ask interviewees to elaborate their statements. 
The full series of five levels of abstraction was not reached 
with all interviewees, but some were able to give chains of 
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reasons. From the energy use perspective, cases in which we 
were particularly interested were where interviewees said that 
they would open the window (9-12, 14-16) or, in 15’s case, wait 
for colleagues to open the window, if too hot, since as outlined 
above, this has the potential for significant energy inefficiency 
through behaviour. 
Figure 2(a) shows an example of the 5 Whys chain for 
interviewee 12, based on his reasons for opening the window if 
too hot. In some cases, as here, the ‘causal chain’ branches and 
re-joins, as the same ultimate reason is given for more than one 
reason along the way. In this case, 12 revealed that while one of 
the immediate reasons he opens the window is simply that the 
radiator valve is stuck, there are also deeper factors around his 
experiences with contacting maintenance staff, and ultimately his 
perception of what his job entails and what is out of scope. It 
is our contention that each of these reasons essentially implies a 
problem-solution pair. 
As Figure 2(b) shows, it is trivial to suggest ‘solutions’ at 
each level based on providing alternative ways of fixing one or 
more of the reasons given by the interviewee–fixing the radiator 
valve, improving maintenance’s problem-logging procedures 
and including energy use as part of staff’s responsibility–but 
each of these solutions is acting on a different way of framing 
the problematic behaviour. The ‘ultimate’ reason may be a lack 
Table 1. Interviewees’ statements about what they would do if too hot or too cold in the office.
Interviewee “If I were too hot, then I would...” “If I were too cold, then I would...” 
1 Remove some layers of clothes Not take any action
2 Sit near draughty window if possible Put on more layers of clothes
See if possible to open window
Get a cold drink
Go outside to get some fresh air
Contact facilities manager, if really bad
3 Remove some layers of clothes Put on more layers of clothes1
Go outside to get some fresh air
4 Remove some layers of clothes Put on more layers of clothes
Contact facilities manager, if really bad
5 Not take any action Put on more layers of clothes
6 Remove some layers of clothes Put on more layers of clothes
7 Remove some layers of clothes Go home
8 Sit near draughty window if possible Not take any action
Remove some layers of clothes
9 Open window Adjust radiator 2
Adjust radiator 2 Use own electric heater
10 Open window 3 Put on more layers of clothes1
11 Open window Use own electric heater
Contact facilities manager, if really bad 4 Contact facilities manager, if really bad
12 Open window 4 Use own electric heater
13 Adjust radiator 2 Adjust radiator 2
Use own electric fan Use own electric heater
Open door 5
14 Talk to colleagues to decide on course of action Not take any action
Open window
15 Wait for colleagues to open window Put on more layers of clothes
16 Open window Adjust radiator 2
Try to understand air conditioning interface
1 3 and 10 mentioned keeping extra clothes (jumpers) in the office for exactly these occasions. 
2 The radiators had simple manual (rather than thermostatic) valves, so it was not possible to adjust temperature directly. 
3 10 commented “I don’t think the radiator valves are there for me to adjust”. 
4 11 and 12 noted that the radiator valves in each of their offices were stuck ‘on’ and so were not adjustable by hand. 
5 13 said her preferred cooling method was to prop open the office door into the corridor, but this was “frowned upon”.
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of perceived responsibility for energy use, but the immediate 
situated reason of a stuck radiator valve is no less ‘valid’ as a 
problem to be addressed (it is certainly quicker to fix). Some will 
be ‘design’ solutions, others not.
This analysis of individual interviewees’ reasoning 
was made more generally applicable by restating each of the 
reasons given, at different levels of abstraction, as a heuristic, 
and tabulating them so that common elements can be more 
easily identified. As Table 2 shows, once restated as heuristics, 
extracting design ‘implications’ from each is relatively simple, if 
subjective: the heuristic is again just a problem-solution pair, and 
for each, possibly applicable ‘solutions’ are easy to conceive. It 
is noticeable that the design implications frame the problem as 
being variously about changes to physical equipment (to lead to 
changes in behaviour) and changes to people’s behaviour through 
service or support changes: there is no hard distinction between 
what might be considered service design or product design. It is 
important to remember that while some of the possible ‘solutions’ 
listed in Table 2 appear more complex than the existing responses 
in Table 1, many of these existing responses were essentially 
‘unacceptable’ to building managers, due to energy inefficiency. 
Equally, it is important to note that the interpretations in Table 2 
Figure 2. (a) The 5 Whys chain for interviewee 12 and (b) with immediate ‘solutions’ for each reason. 
Table 2. Restating interviewees’ reasons for opening windows as heuristics.
Why? Restated as a heuristic Possible implications Possible ‘solutions’
Don't think radiator valves are for 
me to adjust.
If I haven't been told I can 
adjust it, then I won't adjust it.
Make it explicit that he can 
adjust the radiator.
Signs, annotations, training;  
lock windows.
Valve is stuck; don't want to have 
to get maintenance involved.
If I can solve a problem myself, 
I will.
Make it easier for her to solve 
the problem the `right' way.
Fix radiator valve, let her know that this 
should be the first recourse; lock windows.
Valve is stuck; I want an 
immediate solution to my 
problem [being too hot].
If something gives me an 
immediate solution to my 
problem, I will do it.
Make it easy for him to solve 
the problem immediately.
Fix radiator valve; let him know that  
this should be the first recourse;  
lock windows.
Maintenance didn't do anything last 
time I called them.
If something doesn't inspire 
my trust / confidence, I won't 
bother doing it again.
Improve his confidence 
and trust in maintenance's 
response.
Improve problem-logging and  
resolution system.
It's not part of my job.
If something isn't my 
responsibility, I won't do it
Make it clear that energy 
efficient behaviour is part of 
his responsibility.
Include responsible energy use in staff 
duties; other measures to help foster a 
more energy efficient culture at work.
Asks others first; colleagues and I 
need to agree what to do, to keep 
everyone happy [in shared office].
If the group agrees with a 
course of action, then I'll do it.
Design something which 
influences the group 
behaviour.
Enable group opinion to be measured and 
shared–maybe some kind of  
voting system.
No user-accessible controls in this 
office [so window is opened].
If there's only one solution 
easily available to us, then 
we'll take it.
Make it possible for staff to 
control the temperature of the 
radiators in their office.
Add radiator controls or user-accessible 
room thermostat; let users know they 
should use it as a first recourse.
It makes me feel more comfortable 
immediately.
If something helps me 
feel more comfortable 
immediately, I’ll do it.
Make it possible for staff to 
make themselves comfortable 
immediately, efficiently.
Add quick-acting radiator control; ask users 
to turn radiator off before opening window; 
interlock radiator and window opening.
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are inherently subjective–we are not claiming that the heuristics, 
implications and solutions are the only way of dealing with users’ 
comments, but they represent a set of possible ways of framing 
the problems and solutions concerned. Useful framings might not 
emerge within five levels of questions; on the other hand, they 
may emerge straight away.
In the case study in question, the next stage of the process 
was to identify which of the possible implications and concepts 
were likely to be actionable in the subsequent stages of the 
project, in the specific workplaces concerned. But in the wider 
field of design for behaviour change, something along the lines 
of Zachrisson and Boks’ (2012) challenge introduced at the start 
of section 1 is relevant: is it possible to match design strategies 
with particular heuristics across domains and problems? Are there 
other situations where, for example, the “If the group agrees with 
a course of action, then I’ll do it” heuristic mentioned in Table 2 
also applies? And if so, do the pertinent design implications and 
concepts exhibit similar principles? Ultimately, could extracting 
and abstracting behavioural heuristics, through user research, 
provide a ‘common language’ of problem-solution pairs enabling 
translation between design principles for behaviour change and 
the kinds of behavioural situations in which they apply?
Reverse Engineering of  
Existing Examples
To explore the potential of this ‘common language’ approach, 
we attempted to ‘reverse engineer’ existing examples of 
systems known to be designed to influence user behaviour, to 
uncover heuristics which users are (potentially) assumed to 
be following for the intended behaviour to occur. To do this 
we applied a process similar to the 5 Whys decomposition 
employed in interviews with users, this is essentially a mirror 
image of the interview process: interrogating existing examples 
to obtain heuristics at different levels of abstraction, rather 
than interviewing users themselves. After partially exploring 
one example ourselves–perhaps ‘obvious’ because of its 
ubiquity, but nevertheless successful–see ‘Example: Amazon 
recommendations’ below, workshop participants at an interaction 
design industry conference were then invited to carry out the 
decomposition process on three further examples (see below 
‘Examples: Codecademy, OPOWER and Foodprints’).
Example: Amazon Recommendations
Amazon, the online retailer, is well-known for its recommendation 
engine (e.g., Iskold, 2007); as of 2006, 35 per cent of the 
company’s sales came via recommendation elements on the 
website (Marshall, 2006). Users (potential customers) browsing 
for products, such as books, are–in addition to basic product 
information–presented with a number of page elements using 
variants of ‘social proof’ (Anderson, 2010; Cialdini, 2007) to 
influence their decision-making, based on extensive, ongoing 
background analysis of shopping habits by Amazon. These can 
include “Frequently bought together”, “Customers who bought 
this item also bought”, “What other items do customers buy 
after viewing this item?”, “Customers also bought items by”, 
“Customers who bought items in your recent history also bought” 
and “Listmania” (which features customer-curated recommended 
lists of items with similar characteristics), as well as reviews 
of the item by other customers, who can give one to five stars 
and write comments (in turn, users can rate the reviews as being 
helpful or not, and the ‘most helpful’ reviews are promoted in 
page position; frequent and well-regarded reviewers receive ‘flair’ 
next to their names). 
Each of these many elements–in a slightly different 
way–uses the behaviour and opinions of other users, individually 
or as a ‘community’ to attempt to influence the behaviour of the 
potential customer. They could all be classified as using ‘social 
proof’ as a design principle, but this misses the nuances of the 
approach. The fact that Amazon uses so many variants–and 
presumably tracks closely the effectiveness of each with different 
customers and market segments–suggests that slightly different 
models of behaviour underlie each element, and what ‘works’ for 
some users does not work for everyone in terms of influencing 
behaviour (Kaptein & Eckles, 2010). Each variant makes slightly 
different assumptions about how people will respond the 
heuristics that are being followed. What might glibly be classified 
as ‘social proof’ comprises assumptions such as:
• People will do what they see other people doing.
• People will value or do what seems to be most popular.
• People value or respect others’ opinions and actions.
• People want to learn more about a subject.
• People will buy multiple items at the same time.
There are many other possible assumptions, of course. 
But taking “People will do what they see other people doing” as 
an example statement, if we follow a similar process of asking 
“Why?” repeatedly, as in the section ‘Elaborating the heuristics: 
5 Whys and further abstraction’ –“Why will people do what they 
see other people doing?”–we are able to tease out some possible 
factors (Figure 3), which can easily be expressed as heuristics. 
For the five heuristics uncovered, it is not too difficult to 
think of design techniques which are directly relevant:
• If lots of people are doing it, do it → Show directly 
how many (or what proportion of) people are choosing 
an option.
• If people like me are doing it, do it → Show the user that 
his or her peers, or people in a similar situation, make a 
particular choice.
• If people that I aspire to be like are doing it, do it → Show 
the user that aspirational figures are making a particular 
choice.
• If something worked before, do it again → Remind the 
user what worked last time.
• If an expert recommends it, do it → Show the user that 
expert figures are making a particular choice.
As with the implications and concepts in Table 2, each 
technique has the property of framing both problem and solution 
in a particular way. If user research with Amazon customers led 
to the expression of a heuristic such as “If people that I aspire to 
be like are doing it, do it”, then a way of framing the specification 
which directly relates to the heuristic becomes immediately 
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clear; depending on the heuristics uncovered, it might be that 
majority preference, authority-based messaging, friend-based 
recommendations, peer voting, celebrity or expert endorsement, 
or some other techniques entirely could match groups of users’ 
heuristics better. Sometimes, as with Amazon, a product or 
service will use more than one technique simultaneously, 
employing multiple elements, to try to satisfy multiple heuristics, 
or perhaps because the designers are not sure which heuristics are 
being used by individual users. Kaptein and Eckles’ (2010) work 
on persuasion profiling suggests a way forward which would 
allow directly targeted elements tailored to what influences 
individual users.
Examples: Codecademy, OPOWER and Foodprints
The analysis outlined above with the Amazon example is 
exploratory, rough and subjective, carried out by one of the authors. 
In practice, working with heuristics in design for behaviour 
change would need to be done as part of a design process, by 
designers rather than solely academics. To explore how this would 
work, a workshop session was run at Interaction ’12 in Dublin, 
Ireland, a major interaction design industry conference. Forty-one 
participants, including designers and researchers, worked in 
groups on exploring the assumptions inherent in elements of three 
current digital services designed to influence users’ behaviour:
Codecademy offers interactive tutorials in Javascript 
and Python, using a range of design techniques to encourage 
participants to sign up and remain motivated. There is 
‘gamification’ (Deterding, Dixon, Nacke, O’Hara, & Sicart, 
2011) in terms of badges and points, but the focus of the user 
experience is rapid feedback and a structured progression, 
intended to maintain engagement. As part of the ‘2012 Code 
Year’ initiative (which received 300,000 sign-ups in the first 
week: Pavlus, 2012), other techniques such as commitment & 
consistency and social proof (Cialdini, 2007) come into play, as 
participants share their commitment.
OPOWER provides a service to electricity and gas 
suppliers where customers receive ‘Home Energy Reports’ 
featuring comparisons with the average energy used by neighbours 
(with similar size homes) and by the most efficient comparable 
neighbours. The bills then suggest improvements that customers 
can make in order to improve their performance. The focus of 
the graphics is not financial, and the energy quantities given are 
normative–comparisons with a customer’s ‘peer group’. The 
graphs are paired with ‘smiley faces’, giving an alternative way 
of interpreting performance–shying away from criticism, only 
neutral or positive terms are used (and no ‘sad faces’: Schultz, 
Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius,, 2007). A randomised 
controlled trial based on 600,000 households in the US (Allcott, 
2011), found an average 2% reduction in energy use among 
households receiving the OPOWER reports. 
Foodprints (Figure 4), part of the CarbonCulture platform, 
combines a web app, ‘dashboard’, and physical loyalty cards 
and stamps in company canteens to help staff reduce their meat 
and dairy intake, for both environmental (carbon footprint) and 
health reasons. The app uses some gamification elements (points, 
‘hidden treasure’, etc) and a ‘social proof’ ticker showing the 
meals that colleagues have recorded. The points contribute 
towards winning prizes, though not in competition with other 
users (Nicholson, 2011). 
Through a similar decomposition process to the one 
described in ‘Example: Amazon recommendations’, groups 
extracted a handful of statements of possible heuristics for each 
example (Table 3), with possible implications for design choices. 
These are by no means necessarily criteria that the developers 
of Codecademy, OPOWER or Foodprints had in mind for their 
products, but each heuristic / implication could be exemplified with 
elements of the products concerned. 
Thus, if a similar behavioural heuristic–e.g., “If my 
neighbour does it, I should do it”–were uncovered from user 
research in a different context with a different product, the 
design element from OPOWER fulfilling the “Show users 
what their neighbours are doing” criterion could be used as 
an example on which to base a new element. In this particular 
case OPOWER’s visual comparisons with the energy used by 
neighbours is presented as part of a printed report, but as Atwood 
(2012) notes, the example translates well into wholly unrelated 
contexts, such as the design of the reputation system for online 
question-and-answer forums.
People will do what they see 
other people doing
People trust others’
recommendations
They’ve been 
good in the past
If something worked
before, do it again
If an expert 
recommends it, do it
People don’t know 
what to do and are 
looking for guidance
If lots of people
are doing it, do it
If people like me
are doing it, do it
Why?
Why?
Why?
They come from 
subject experts
If people that I aspire
to be like are doing it, 
do it
Assumption inherent
in design feature
Some possible 
heuristics
Figure 3. Extracting some possible heuristics from an assumption inherent in the use of ‘social proof’.
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In the workshop, participants went on to assemble sets of 
heuristics into fictional ‘personas’, for whom they then generated 
design concepts. While outside the scope of this paper, it is worth 
noting in passing the possibility of using heuristics as a way of 
triggering designers to think outside their own perspective on a 
problem–“ design for someone who’s following this rule rather 
than that one” or “design so that people following either of these 
rules will be satisfied”.
Figure 4. The Foodprints online dashboard and cards (Nicholson, 2011). 
Table 3. Possible heuristics, and design implications, extracted by workshop participants.
Example Possible heuristics Possible implications for design choices
Codecademy If something helps me improve myself, do it. Show users that they are improving themselves.
If I feel like I am accomplishing something, then keep going. Make it clear what users are accomplishing.
If something makes me feel better about my self-discipline, do it. Congratulate users for their self-discipline.
If it makes me look more knowledgeable in the eyes of others,  
then I will continue to take part.
Enable users to show off their knowledge to other users.
If I can track my progress, then I will stay engaged. Enable users to track their progress easily.
If the challenge pushes me the right amount, then I will  
stay engaged.
Make sure that the level of difficulty progresses in line with users' 
developing abilities.
OPOWER If my neighbour does it, I should do it. Show users what their neighbours are doing.
If life’s a competition, I will try to win it. Frame activities as part of a competition.
If I can see that it saves me money, I will do it. Show users the money they will save.
If I set myself goals, I will try to meet them. Make it easy for users to set themselves goals and track their progress.
If I don’t want to be the ‘weak link’, I will act in the desired way. Emphasise that trying will avoid the user becoming the ‘weak link’.
If I want to be ‘normal’, I should do it. Emphasise what is ‘normal’ for the group.
If I get appreciation from others, I will continue to do it. Give users explicit appreciation, from other users as well as directly.
If it stops me being the ‘bad guy’, I will do it. Congratulate users for being the ‘good guy’.
If it stops me feeling guilty, I will do it. Enable users to overcome guilt.
If it makes me feel good about being sustainable, then I will do it.
Show users that they are being more sustainable, and 
congratulate them for it.
Foodprints If I get a reward, then I will do it. Give users rewards for taking part.
If it is not too much effort, then I will do it. Make it easy to take part without much effort.
If I can feel good about myself, then I will do it. Make it easy for users to feel good about themselves.
If I can show off about how well I am doing, then I will do it. Enable users to show off what they're doing to other users.
If I can see benefits in more than one part of my life, then I will do it.
Emphasise multiple benefits in different areas of life  
(e.g., carbon footprint and health).
If it makes me feel healthier, then I will do it.
Emphasise health benefits and show users how taking part could 
be helping their health.
If it does not punish me for days when I don't take part,  
then I will keep going.
Don't punish occasional users or those who miss days.
If everyone else is doing it, then I will do it. Show that lots of other people are using the service and taking part.
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Discussion: Fitting into Design Practice
Where do behavioural heuristics fit into a design process for 
behaviour change?
The two approaches which were explained in the sections 
‘Case study: extracting heuristics around interaction with heating’ 
and ‘Reverse engineering of existing examples’ are something 
like a pincer movement, arriving from two directions at heuristics 
as a common language of problem-solution pairs. The points 
where the approaches meet are at various levels of abstraction, 
but these help provide design practitioners with a variety of routes 
between user research in a particular behavioural situation, and 
design principles for behaviour change which are relevant in that 
context; the levels of abstraction are necessarily different ways of 
modelling the problem / solution space, rather than a deterministic 
single route from current behaviour to desired behaviour. Using 
behavioural heuristics in the design process, starting from the 
behavioural situation itself, could thus comprise:
• Contextual research with users of the product, service 
or environment in question, including ‘5 Whys’-style 
interviews to extract and elaborate the heuristics 
potentially being followed.
• Analysing and grouping the heuristics uncovered to 
segment users according to heuristics being followed, and 
to identify different levels of design intervention feasible, 
by mapping heuristics to relevant design techniques.  
• Generating design concepts based on relevant techniques, 
and making a selection of those to develop further based 
on appropriate criteria.    
• Prototyping and/or implementing solutions, and 
evaluating the effects on behaviour as appropriate.
The aim is for heuristics to become a tool for helping 
designers to frame ‘behavioural problems’ via contextual research 
with users, and with mapping to relevant design principles 
(and examples). Before the use of heuristics can be presented 
as a complete ‘system’, this is of course one important element 
requiring further development: developing a process for this 
mapping, in a way which is applicable by designers engaged in 
user research, fitting into methods and processes already used. 
We suggest that this will enable many of the diverse current 
approaches to classifying design for behaviour change techniques 
(e.g., Brand, 2004; Fogg & Hreha, 2010; Lockton et al., 2010a; 
Lidman & Renström, 2011; Tang & Bhamra, 2008; Tromp et 
al., 2011; Wever et al., 2008; Zachrisson & Boks, 2012) to be 
described in common language, and so more easily applied as part 
of a design process as problems are investigated and re-framed.
The focus is initially at least on the immediate context of 
interaction, but a laddering approach to interviewing can help 
elaborate elements of users’ attitudes and ‘background’ reasons 
for particular behaviour. This offers the potential of addressing all 
three of the ‘A-B-C’ of attitudes, behaviour and context inherent 
in behavioural models such as Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz 
(1995) and Stern (2000) which thus far have not received much 
attention within design research. It is true that the behavioural 
heuristics approach as presented in this paper is mainly concerned 
with investigating and re-designing existing systems rather 
than creating entirely novel ones–and this can be seen as a 
limitation–but as Michl (2002) suggests, most commercial design 
practice is ‘redesign’ in some form. Linking heuristics to design 
techniques for behaviour change could enable the process to 
become more generative, enabling the development of innovative 
solutions rooted in real problems. 
A Possible Extension
One possible refinement of “if... then” heuristics could be 
structuring them along the lines of Minsky’s (1974, p. 1) concept 
of frames in artificial intelligence, which represent “a stereotyped 
situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to 
a child’s birthday party”, with attached information about how to 
proceed and what can be expected. 
This would capture the idea of familiar situations being 
recognised by users and particular heuristics being enacted, also 
thereby explicitly taking learned experience into account–nd 
drawing on knowledge from usability research around interaction 
design patterns and conventions. For example, if someone needs to 
use a mobile phone he or she has never used before to make a call, 
the interaction process could be modelled in terms of heuristics 
involving recognising interface or physical form elements (or not), 
looking for labels and familiar (or not) icons, and so on, in order 
to work out how to make a call. Each heuristic has the potential 
for design intervention to influence the user’s behaviour. The idea 
also recalls Klein’s (1999) recognition-primed decision model, 
which considers how “decision makers size up the situation to 
recognise which course of action makes sense, and the way they 
evaluate that course of action by imagining it” (p. 24): essentially, 
a stage of pattern recognition, and a stage (if necessary) of 
rapid mental simulation before deciding to carry out the action 
or modify it. The elements of the model important in a design 
practice context are likely to be different to those in which the 
models were developed, but that need not stop our appropriation 
and adoption of models which offer us useful perspectives during 
the design process.
Applicability, Limitations and Justification
It is true that the use of heuristics for modelling can be seen as 
extremely reductionist: representing users as bundles of rules is 
close to treating “the human as a system component” (Jääskö & 
Keinonen, 2006, 2010; Rasmussen, 1986, p. 61), maybe even 
the “trivial machine” of von Foerster (2002). The intention is, 
nevertheless, to represent, via a very simple modelling approach, 
the contexts in which interaction behaviour occurs with the 
products and services we design. 
While simple statements of “if... then” heuristics will not 
capture many of the nuances of the situated strategies people use, 
they do permit a more granular framing of problems and possible 
solutions than a number of existing approaches to design for 
behaviour change, and indeed than conventional approaches to 
mental models. There are, of course, risks of oversimplification, 
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and even of stereotyping users or user groups, but being able to 
elaborate multiple levels of abstraction–describing problems in 
multiple ways based on insights from users themselves–goes 
some way towards mitigating this. As with the use of personas 
in user-centred design, avoiding stereotyping while still 
producing useful descriptions of individuals (and their 
behaviour) is a challenge, probably best addressed through 
triangulation, using multiple research methods to compose more 
informed representations.
The heuristics approach focuses on individuals (and 
individual decision-making, even when referenced to others) 
rather than taking into account the wider ecology of interaction 
situations (Forlizzi, 2008), and this will affect the situations 
where heuristics are useful in design. For example, if research 
with individual users is not possible, is it feasible to extract 
heuristics usefully from automatically generated data such as 
web analytics? What about physical products where this kind of 
tracking is not possible? Can ‘revealed’ heuristics, without the 
elaboration provided by the ‘5 Whys’ stage, still be useful, or will 
this level of abstraction be simply too far away from the users 
themselves? In some circumstances, possibly–for example cases 
relating to safety, where designers may want to change people’s 
behaviour regardless of the level of users’ understanding (see 
Lockton et al., 2012 for a discussion)–but this misses the benefits 
which the process outlined in this paper can offer. 
If heuristics can be derived from empirical user 
research, they can help ensure that users themselves, and their 
understanding of situations, are included in the design process. As 
far as designing behaviour change goes, we believe that this is not 
just desirable, but essential. 
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